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1 Introduction
In many European countries, wages are set in two stages. First, industry-level collective bargaining
establishes a binding wage oor, common to all rms in the industry. At a second stage, rm-
specic arrangements determine a mark-up on top of the central wage. Such a two-tiered wage
setting system tends to originate a large di¤erence between actual paid wages and the central wage
oor, a phenomena typically referred to as the wage cushion or the wage drift.1
What explains the wage set in each of these stages? The key contribution of this paper is to show
that both the industry wage oor and the average wage cushion are systematically associated with
the degree of rm heterogeneity in the industry. The industry wage oor is negatively correlated,
while the average wage cushion is positively correlated, with the productivity spread. The main
intuition for these results is that in industries with more heterogeneous rms an industry-wide
union has a rational incentive to impose a lower wage oor in order to preclude job losses in less
productive rms. Greater rm heterogeneity and a lower wage oor, on the other hand, leave more
room for rm-specic rent-sharing, thereby increasing the average wage cushion.
To formalise these arguments, we develop a model of Cournot oligopoly with rm productivity
heterogeneity and a two-tiered wage setting system. At the outset, an industry-wide monopoly
union sets a wage oor, common to all producers. At a second stage, rm-specic wages and
employment are determined. To characterise wage determination at the local level, we adopt
a general formulation of rent-sharing, which is consistent with di¤erent underlying mechanisms
proposed in the literature to explain its existence   namely, rm-specic fair wage policies and local
bargaining. When setting the wage oor at the outset of the game, the central union anticipates
the implications of its actions for the determination of actual wages and employment at the second
stage. The model yields clear and intuitive predictions about the e¤ect of rm heterogeneity 
measured as a mean-preserving spread of labour productivities  on wage setting. Notably, for
reasonableparameter congurations, we nd that more heterogeneity leads to a lower industry
wage oor and a higher (average) wage cushion; since the former of these e¤ects tends to dominate
the latter, all else equal workers in more heterogeneous industries tend to get lower wages.
We then proceed by taking the model predictions to the data. With that aim, we exploitQuadros
de Pessoal, an unusually comprehensive administrative worker-rm dataset that is particularly well
suited for investigating this question. Quadros de Pessoal comprises information on virtually all
workers, rms and collective bargaining agreements for the Portuguese private sector. It also allows
1Such a two-tiered wage setting process is prevalent in the Nordic countries (Calmfors, 1990; Holden, 1989, 1998),
Germany (Hübler and Jirjahn, 2003), Italy (Ordine, 1995), Spain (Dolado et al, 1997), The Netherlands (Butter and
Eppink, 2003) and Portugal (Cardoso and Portugal, 2005). Flanagan (1999) and OECD (2004) o¤er recent literature
surveys. Following Cardoso and Portugal (2005), throughout this paper we will use the expression wage cushion to
label the di¤erence between actual wages and the union wage oor, noting however that the concept wage drift has
also been frequently adopted in the literature to designate this phenomena.
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to distinguish, at the individual-level, between the industry wage oor and the wage cushion. Since
there is a unique identier for the collective agreement that covers each worker, it is possible to
determine the exact set of rms that constitute the industry for collective bargaining purposes.
Given that there is also information on the rm side, we are able to compute standard measures
of rm productivity heterogeneity in each industry, and then test whether they are systematically
associated with the industry wage oor and the average wage cushion (and hence with actual paid
wages). The econometric results conrm our theoretical predictions.
This paper relates to several strands of existing research. There are some structural similarities
between the model presented here and a relatively small literature on unionised labour markets
with a two-tiered wage setting process. Inspired by the collective bargaining system of the Nordic
countries, Holden (1998) provides a model in which local unions make use of work-to-rulepractices
to negotiate a wage rate that exceeds the central wage oor.2 The link between the two tiers of the
wage determination process is explicitly modelled: when bargaining at the industry-level, central
unions fully anticipate that the negotiated wage will constitute the fall-back position of rm-level
unions during subsequent local bargaining. As a result, the expected wage cushion is fully reected
in central negotiations. A competing view associates the wage cushion with e¢ ciency wage policies
pursued by the rms. Muysken and van Veen (1996) o¤er a model in which, rather than forced by
local unions to divide an exogenous amount of rents, employers have a rational incentive to pay a
mark-up on top of the contractual wage in order to maximise worker e¤ort. Their paper provides,
therefore, an alternative explanation for the wage cushion, which is expected to be particularly
relevant in countries where centralised negotiations are not typically followed by local collective
bargaining.3 A common feature of this line of work is the use of a representative rm framework.
Therefore, the implication of rm heterogeneity for wage setting which is the central focus of our
paper is never an issue in this literature.
A set of contributions in the union-oligopoly literature are also relevant in our context. The
seminal paper by Dowrick (1989), and several extensions (e.g., Dhillon and Petrakis, 2002), o¤er
oligopoly models with centralised union wage setting.4 There are, however, two crucial di¤erences
between this line of work and our paper. First, the assumption that rms are homogeneous. Second,
the absence of local (rm-specic) wage setting following centralised bargaining. As a result, in all
these models the actual paid wage is always equal to the central contracted wage.
We would also like to draw attention to a recent literature on how rm heterogeneity inuences
wage determination. Building on the inuential paper of Melitz (2003), recent work by Egger and
Kreickemeier (2008) and Davis and Harrigan (2007) shows that, in the presence of rm-specic
2Holden (1988), Hibbs and Locking (1996) and Ordine (1996) provide related contributions.
3A limiting feature of their model, however, is that the central wage oor is exogenous throughout the analysis.
4Bastos and Kreickemeier (2007) provide a related analysis in a general equilibrium context.
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e¢ ciency wage policies, rm heterogeneity leads to di¤erent wages for ex-ante identical workers.5
Neither of these papers, however, focuses on union wage setting or two-tiered wage setting systems.
Finally, we would like to place our empirical work within the received literature. The empirical
analysis by Cardoso and Portugal (2005) is clearly the closest to our own. Using the same dataset
employed in this paper, they propose a new methodology to infer the contractual wage for each
job category from actual paid wages. Specically, they show that the mode of the distribution of
the base wage for each job category within each collective agreement corresponds with remarkable
accuracy to the wage set through collective bargaining.6 We will use the same procedure here to
compute the union wage oor and the wage cushion. Cardoso and Portugal then report evidence
that a signicant proportion of workers covered by collective agreements actually receive wages
well above the union wage oor. Although agreements are not ordinarily supplemented by local
collective bargaining, rms unilaterally adjust wage policies to reect their specic conditions.
Using a cross-section of the matched worker-rm data for 1999, they nd that the wage cushion
stretches the returns to worker and rm attributes. Crucially, however, Cardoso and Portugal
do not focus on how the degree of rm heterogeneity inuences wage setting, which is the main
contribution of this paper.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 we present a theoretical
model and derive predictions for the empirical analysis. In Section 3 we discuss the empirical
implementation. Our empirical ndings are presented in Section 4. Finally, Section 5 o¤ers some
concluding remarks.
2 A theoretical model
Consider an industry consisting of two rms, each producing a di¤erentiated product. Inverse
demand for the two products is given by
pi = a  qi   bqj ; i; j = 1; 2; i 6= j; (1)
where qi is quantity of product i, supplied by rm i, and b 2 (0; 1) is an inverse measure of the
degree of product di¤erentiation. Where appropriate, we will later refer to b as a measure of the
intensity of competition in the industry.
Each rm uses labour as the only factor of production in a constant-returns-to-scale technology,
5The main focus of these papers is then on how trade liberalisation is likely to a¤ect within-group wage inequality,
and other labour market outcomes.
6To support this claim, they examine the relationship between the contractual wage for each worker category,
obtained directly from published collective agreements, and the corresponding modal base wage in some pre-selected
industries. Such comparisons conrm the high accuracy of this indicator, which is then applied in the remaining
analysis.
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given by the following production functions:
q1 =  (1 + s) l1; (2)
q2 =  (1  s) l2: (3)
We introduce heterogeneity among rms, not workers. Workers are assumed to be ex ante identical,
but technological (or managerial) di¤erences among rms imply that rm heterogeneity is reected
in di¤erences in labour productivity. The mean productivity in the industry is given by , while
the parameter s 2 (0; 1) measures the productivity spread (or the degree of rm heterogeneity).7
We make the crucial assumption that the wage a rm has to pay its workers reects rm-level
rent-sharing. One way to obtain this feature is to adopt the fair wagehypothesis. Assume, as
in Akerlof and Yellen (1990), that workers condition their e¤ort on the wage paid relative to the
wage considered to be fair. If workers receive at least the fair wage, they provide a normal level
of e¤ort. By an appropriate choice of e¤ort function, it will then be optimal for the rm to pay the
fair wage.8 With this assumption, prots are given by
i = pqi   wili; i = 1; 2; (4)
where wi is the fair wage paid to workers at rm i.
It remains to establish the determinants of the fair wage. We use an internal reference per-
spective and assume that the fair wage depends on the rms ability to pay. More specically, we
assume that the fair wage is given by a weighted average of the wage set by a central trade union
and the rms revenue per worker.9 The former constitutes a contracted wage oor for the industry,
while the latter is the rms maximum possible wage o¤er. Denoting the contracted wage oor by
w, the fair wage in rm i is given by
wi = w + (1  )

piqi
li

; (5)
7 It is worth pointing out that the duopoly assumption is made for expositional simplicity and is not crucial for
the generality of the results. It can easily be veried that our main results are qualitatively una¤ected by adding
more rms to the industry while maintaining a symmetric rm heterogeneity.
8For example, as in Akelof and Yellen (1990), if worker e¤ort is given by
e = min
 w
w
; 1

;
where w is the actual paid wage and w is the fair wage, the rm will not benet from paying less than the fair wage,
since e¤ort decreases proportionally if the wage falls short of what the workers consider to be fair.
9This denition of a fair wage is similar in spirit to the one used by Danthine and Kurmann (2006). A somewhat
di¤erent internal reference perspective is used by Akerlof and Yellen (1990), who assume that workers of di¤erent
skills compare their wages to other co-workers within the same rm.
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where  2 (0; 1) is the weight attached to the wage oor relative to the maximum possible wage o¤er.
When the fair wage is, to some degree, determined by internal factors, intra-industry di¤erences in
labour productivity will be reected in wage di¤erences across rms. Notice also that there is an
obvious analytical advantage of this particular specication, namely that a similar wage outcome
can result from local wage bargaining.10 Thus, we can alternatively interpret  as the relative
bargaining power of the rm in local bargaining.
The industry wage oor, w, is set by a central monopoly trade union representing all workers
in the industry. Assuming rent-maximising behaviour, the unions objective function is given by
U =
2X
i=1
(wi   r) li; (6)
where r is the reservation wage level. Standard assumptions on the determinants of r would be the
minimum wage level, the level of unemployment benets, or simply the disutility of work.11
Assuming Cournot competition between the rms in the industry, we consider the following
sequence of events:
1. The central trade union sets the wage oor w that applies for the industry.
2. The rms simultaneously and independently choose employment levels, taking into account
the wage rates they need to pay in order to induce normal e¤ort from their workers.
3. Production takes place and payo¤s are realised.
2.1 Solving for the Cournot-Nash equilibrium
For a given wage oor, w, the two rms decide how many workers to hire, taking into account that
they have to pay them the fair wage, given by (5), to induce normal worker e¤ort. This yields the
following labour demand functions12
l1 (w) =
a (1  s) (1 + s)  w (1  3s)
3b2 (1  s) (1 + s)2 ; (7)
10 It is straightforward to show that the wage given in (5) corresponds exactly to the wage resulting from e¢ cient
bargaining between the rm and a rent-maximising local union, where the disagreement payo¤s of both parties are
zero.
11With heterogeneous rms, there would be an incentive for a central union to wage discriminate, by setting
rm-specic wage oors. Wage discrimination by a central trade union is, however, rarely observed in practice, a fact
that can be explained by bargaining costs and/or egalitarian norms.
12We assume that labour demand is always positive for both rms, ruling out the possibility that the least
productive rm might not survive in the market. This essentially requires that the productivity spread, s, is su¢ ciently
low.
6
l2 (w) =
a (1  s) (1 + s)  w (1 + 3s)
3b2 (1  s)2 (1 + s) : (8)
The corresponding fair wages are then found by inserting the equilibrium expressions for l1 (w) and
l2 (w) into (5), yielding
w1 (w) =
a (1  s) (1 + s) (2  b) (1  ) + w (2  b) (1 + b+ )  ws (2 + b) (1  b+ )
(1  s) (2 + b) (2  b) (9)
and
w2 (w) =
a (1  s) (1 + s) (2  b) (1  ) + w (2  b) (1 + b+ ) + ws (2 + b) (1  b+ )
(1 + s) (2 + b) (2  b) : (10)
It is straightforward to verify that wages paid at both rms are increasing in the wage oor, and
that the wage di¤erence (w1 w2) is increasing in the degree of rm heterogeneity, as measured by
s.
At the outset of the game, the wage oor is set by a central rent-maximising trade union. Thus,
w is given by
w = argmax fU = (w1 (w)  r) l1 (w) + (w2 (w)  r) l2 (w)g ;
yielding
w =
(2  b) a (1  s) (1 + s) (2  b) (b+ 2) + r (2 + b)  2  b+ (2 + b) s2
2
h
(2  b)2 (1 + b+ ) + s2 (2 + b)2 (1  b+ )
i : (11)
From (9)-(10) and (11) it is immediately evident that both the wage oor and the actually
paid wages are increasing in the level of labour productivity (), as expected. For the subsequent
analysis of the wage e¤ects of rm heterogeneity, it is useful to dene some wage concepts. The
wage cushion in rm i is given by i = wi w, the average wage cushion is given by  = 
2
i=1(ili)
2i=1li
,
while the average (actual paid) wage is given by ! = w + .
2.2 Firm heterogeneity and wages
In this section we use our model to analyse the main question posed in the paper; how the distrib-
ution of rm productivities in a given unionised industry a¤ect wage setting, at industry and rm
level.
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2.2.1 The wage oor
The e¤ect of rm heterogeneity on the industry wage oor is derived from (11):
@w
@s
=  2s (2  b)2 a

4 (1 + )  b2 (3  ) (b+ 2)  (1  ) br (2 + b)2h
(2  b)2 (1 + b+ ) + s2 (2 + b)2 (1  b+ )
i2 : (12)
The sign of this expression is determined by the sign of the numerator. Since this is clearly positive,
implying @w=@s < 0, if r ! 0, b! 0 or  ! 1, we establish the most general result of this section:
Proposition 1 A higher degree of rm heterogeneity in the industry will reduce the wage oor if
one or more of the following conditions are met:
(i) The reservation wage level, r, is su¢ ciently low.
(ii) The degree of competition in the industry, b, is su¢ ciently low.
(iii) The rmsshare of rents, , is su¢ ciently high.
The intuition for this result is not straightforward. The central unions wage setting incentives
can be decomposed into two di¤erent channels: the e¤ect of the wage oor on (i) aggregate em-
ployment and (ii) actual wages. Increased rm heterogeneity will change the unions wage setting
incentives through both channels, and in opposite directions.
(i) Increased rm heterogeneity implies that aggregate employment becomes more elastic with
respect to the wage oor. This elasticity is given by
" (w) =  @
 
2i=1li (w)

@w
w
2i=1li (w)
=
 
2  b+ s2 (2 + b)w
a (1  s) (1 + s) (2  b)  (2  b+ (2 + b) s2)w; (13)
from which we derive
@" (w)
@s
=
8asw (2  b)
[a (1  s) (1 + s) (2  b)  (2  b+ (2 + b) s2)w]2 > 0: (14)
A decomposition of the elasticity shows that more heterogeneity increases (reduces) labour demand
elasticity for the low (high) productivity rm. This is because higher (lower) labour productivity
reduces (increases) the e¤ect of an increase in the e¤ective wage rate (i.e., the price of one e¢ ciency
unit of labour) on labour demand. Notice, however, that the impact of a (marginal) change in
labour productivity on the relationship between the wage rate and the e¤ective wage rate, is
smaller the higher the labour productivity is. Therefore, the e¤ect on labour demand elasticity
in the low-productivity rm is always dominating. Thus, all else equal, a central union in a more
heterogeneous industry will set a lower wage oor to stimulate employment in the low-productivity
rm.
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(ii) Increased rm heterogeneity also a¤ects how an increase in the wage oor translates into
an increase in actual paid wages. Specically, the positive relationship between the wage oor and
actual wages becomes overall stronger. From (9) and (10) we can see that it becomes stronger for
the high-productivity rm and weaker for the low-productivity rm,
@2w1
@s@w
=
2b (1  )
(2  b) (2 + b) (1  s)2 > 0; (15)
@2w2
@s@w
=   2b (1  )
(2  b) (2 + b) (s+ 1)2 < 0; (16)
but overall stronger, since
 @2w1@s@w  >  @2w2@s@w . Thus, all else equal, a central union in a more hetero-
geneous industry will set a higher wage oor to induce higher actual wages in the most productive
rm.
The relative strengths of these two opposite incentives are determined by the parameter cong-
uration. A lower reservation wage level means that, all else equal, employment e¤ects are relatively
more important, strengthening the rst incentive relative to the second. On the other hand, a
lower degree of competition and a lower degree of local rent-sharing imply that the relationship
between the wage oor and actual wages are less inuenced by rm heterogeneity, making the
second incentive less important. Why? Because less competition in the market means that pro-
ductivity di¤erences are to a lesser extent reected in relative market shares. Consequently, more
heterogeneity has a lower impact on the allocation of rents, which partly determine the actual paid
wages, when there is less competition in the industry. Similarly, if the rms share less rents with
their workers, productivity di¤erences translate, to a lower degree, into di¤erences in actual wages.
Thus, less competition and/or less local rent-sharing imply that the degree of rm heterogeneity
has a lower impact on the relationship between the wage oor and actual paid wages. Indeed, from
(15) and (16) we see that the relationship between w and wi is independent of s, if b! 0 or  ! 1.
It should be emphasised that the parameter conguration that yields a positive relationship
between rm heterogeneity and the industry wage oor is quite limited. To provide an illustration
of this, consider the case of maximum competition, b = 1. In this case, it is possible to show
that @w=@s < 0, for all admissible values of r, if  > 2 3s(1+s)5+3s(2 s) (< 0:4). Thus, for reasonable
parameter congurations, the dominant incentive of the central union is to stimulate employment
in low-productivity rms, resulting in a lower wage oor in more heterogeneous industries.
2.2.2 The wage cushion
For the sake of analytical feasibility, we will explore the e¤ects of rm heterogeneity on the wage
cushion, and thus on actual wages, by considering the special case of homogeneous products and
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a zero reservation wage.13 This restricts the parameter congurations to a subset where there is
always a negative relationship between the degree of rm heterogeneity and the wage oor, which,
as argued above, we consider to be the most likely case. Setting b = 1 and r = 0, the equilibrium
wage expressions are given by
w =
a (2 + 1) (1  s) (1 + s)
2 (2 +  + 9s2)
; (17)
1 =
a (1 + s) (1  ) [1 + s+ 2s (1 + 3s)]
2 (2 +  + 9s2)
; (18)
2 =
a (1  s) (1  ) [1  s  2s (1  3s)]
2 (2 +  + 9s2)
; (19)
! =
a (1  s) (1 + s) 1 + 4s2 (1  )
2 (1 + s2 (4   1)) : (20)
It is easily shown that increased rm heterogeneity will increase (decrease) the wage cushion in
the high (low) productivity rm; @1=@s > 0 and @2=@s < 0, as expected. More interesting is the
e¤ect on the average wage cushion, given by  = !   w. Using (17) and (20), this e¤ect is
@
@s
=
2as (1  )
h
(1  s)2 (1 + s)2 +	
i
(4s2   s2 + 1)2 ( + 9s2 + 2)2 ; (21)
where 	 =  648s84 + 162s83   144s64   576s63 + 72s62   8s44   100s43   198s42 +
8s4 + 32s23 + 12s22   24s2 + 23 + 102 + 8.
The sign of (21) is given by the sign of the numerator, where the sign of 	 is a priori ambiguous.
By numerical simulations, it can be shown that @=@s > 0, for all , if s < s  0:48. Since s
measures the percentage di¤erence from the mean, s < s appears to be a weak condition. Thus, we
conclude that, for reasonableparameter congurations, a higher degree of rm heterogeneity leads
to a lower industry wage oor but a higher average wage cushion. An increase in the productivity
spread implies a more uneven distribution of rents. For a given wage oor, this should lead to
a lower (higher) wage cushion in low (high) productivity rms. However, since the central union
responds by lowering the industry wage oor, there is less need for a reduction in the wage cushion
in low-productivity rms, while there is more room for an increase in the wage cushion in high-
productivity rms. Furthermore, a higher productivity spread also implies a reallocation of workers
towards the high-productivity rms. Both these e¤ects contribute to an increase in the average
wage cushion.
13Notice that assuming a zero reservation wage is equivalent to letting the central trade union maximise the total
wage bill.
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The e¤ect of rm heterogeneity on the average (actual paid) wage, !, is given by
@!
@s
=
@w
@s
+
@
@s
; (22)
which, due to the potentially opposite signs of @w=@s and @=@s, is generally ambiguous. From
(22), the total e¤ect is given by
@!
@s
=  4as

 + s2 (1  )  4s2 + 2  s2
(4s2   s2 + 1)2 < 0; (23)
implying that the e¤ect via the industry wage oor always dominates, establishing a negative
relationship between rm heterogeneity and average actual paid wages.
Based on the above analysis, we postulate the following hypotheses for the empirical analysis.
Industries exhibiting larger rm heterogeneity, measured by a mean-preserving spread of labour
productivites, are expected to be characterised by
(i) a lower industry wage oor;
(ii) a higher (average) wage cushion;
(iii) a lower (average) actual paid wage.
3 Empirical implementation
3.1 Data
We test our theory using data from Quadros de Pessoal (QP) for the years 1991 to 2000. This is
an administrative dataset that comprises information on virtually all workers, rms and collective
agreements from the private sector in Portugal. It gathers information from a compulsory census
run by the Ministry of Employment, covering the population of rms with wage earners in manu-
facturing and services. Each rm is required to provide information on an annual basis about its
characteristics and those of each individual that comprises its workforce.
Firm-level information includes annual sales, number of employees, industry code, geographical
location and date of constitution. The set of worker characteristics includes wages (monthly base
wage and other components of pay), gender, schooling, date of starting, occupation and hours
worked. In addition, the worker data includes unique identiers for the collective bargaining agree-
ment that covers the worker, as well as for the corresponding professional category for collective
bargaining purposes. The rst digit of the collective agreement identier indicates the type of
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contract that covers the worker (sectoral, multi-rm, rm, mandatory regime). A worker may also
be matched to the rm.
An important feature of these data is that particular care is placed on the reliability of the
information. Indeed, the data are used by the Ministry of Employment for checking the employers
compliance with labour law. Moreover, Portuguese law makes it compulsory for rms to make this
information available to every worker in a public place of the establishment.
Extensive checks have been performed to guarantee the accuracy of worker and rm data,
according to the procedures outlined in the Appendix. After these checks, we kept for analysis
full-time wage earners working at least 25 hours a week, aged between 16 and 65, earning at least
the national minimum wage, employed in rms located in mainland Portugal. As in Cardoso and
Portugal (2005), because the contractual wage is computed as the mode of the distribution of base
wages for each job category within each collective agreement, only categories comprising at least
50 workers and agreements with at least 1,000 workers were kept for the analysis. In line with
the theoretical framework of the previous section, we restrict the analysis to workers covered by
sectoral agreements, who represent about 88% of these workers. The resulting panel comprises
information on 1,886,703 workers, 216,681 rms and 198 sectoral agreements, yielding a total of
7,420,900 worker-year observations.
3.2 Computing the wage oor and the wage cushion
Following Cardoso and Portugal (2005), we distinguish between contractual wages, wage cushion
and actual wages. By comparing the wage information available in Quadros de Pessoal with
information on contractual wages for each worker category published in collective agreements,
Cardoso and Portugal show that the mode of the base wage distribution for each professional
category within each collective agreement corresponds strongly, in some cases with remarkable
accuracy, to the wage that is set via collective bargaining.14 We adopt the same procedure here to
compute the contractual wage. The wage cushion for worker k = f1; :::; Ng in year t = f1; :::; Tg is
dened as:
kt = ln

wkt
wcat

; (24)
where wkt is the overall monthly earnings actually received by individual k in year t (including the
base wage, tenure-related and other regularly paid components) and wcat is the modal base wage
14Cardoso and Portugal explicitly check the relationship between the contractual wages and the mode of the base
wage distribution for each worker category, within each collective agreement, for three di¤erent (and large) industries
in two di¤erent years. They nd that the correlation between the contractual wage and the mode of the base wage
ranges from 77 to 99 percent.
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for the workers professional category, within the collective agreement that covers the worker in year
t. The following subsection outlines the empirical strategy for examining the e¤ect of the levels
and distribution of rm productivities in each industry on contractual wages, the wage cushion and
actual wages.
3.3 Econometric model
We adopt the following econometric specication:
wagekt = xit + yjt + at + sat + k + v +  r + t + kt: (25)
As the dependent variable, we consider the central wage oor, the wage cushion and actual wage,
as dened in the previous sub-section: wagekt = fwcat; kt; wktg. Our central variables at and sat
measure, respectively, the mean and the spread of rm labour productivity within the collective
agreement that covers the worker. Our main interest lies in the coe¢ cient , which captures the
e¤ect of rm heterogeneity. The mean of rm labour productivity, at, is included since, in order
meaningfully to compare rm heterogeneity across collective agreements, we obviously need to
control for the mean. The set of explanatory variables also includes: xkt, a vector of individual
characteristics; yjt, a vector of characteristics for rm j at which worker k is employed in year t;
k, a pure individual unobserved e¤ect; v, a pure industry e¤ect;  r, a pure region e¤ect; t, a
xed time e¤ect; and, nally, kt is an exogenous disturbance.
In the empirical analysis, we measure at and sat, respectively, as the average and the mean
absolute deviation (MAD) of rm sales per employee within the collective agreement that covers
the worker.15 ;16 The vector of worker control variables includes gender, age, age squared, years
of schooling, tenure, tenure less than one year and four occupational dummies based on the 1988
International Standard Classication of Occupations (ISCO-88). This classication provides four
skill-levels which are based on (i) the level of general education required to perform a job; and
(ii) the job-related formal training required to perform a job (ILO, 1990).17 The vector of rm
characteristics includes rm size (log of number of employees), age, and nominal average labour
productivity (log of rm annual sales per employee). To control for unobserved industry charac-
teristics, all regressions include a full set of fteen industry-dummies. In addition, the regressions
include ve regional dummies to account for disparities in earnings across regions. As is standard
in the literature, wages and rm sales are deated by the CPI and the GDP deator, respectively.18
15 In the absence of data on intermediate inputs and inventories, the use of sales per employee to proxy rm labour
productivity is standard in the literature (see, for example, Franco and Philippon, 2007).
16As a robustness check, we also use the standard deviation as an alternative spread measure. See Section 4.2.
17See the Appendix for a detailed description.
18Data on CPI and GDP deators come from the National Statistics Institute of Portugal.
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics, Regressions data, 1991-2000
Mean SD Min Max
Wage oor (log of wage oor in Euros) 6.06 0.33 5.37 8.79
Actual wage (log of actual wage in Euros) 6.29 0.45 5.71 10.30
Wage cushion= ln

actual wage
wage oor

0.23 0.35 -2.77 4.57
Wage cushion2 = ln

base wage
wage oor

0.11 0.32 -2.82 4.57
Male 0.61 0.49 0 1
Schooling 6.23 3.29 0 16
Age 36.01 11.03 16 65
Age squared 1,418.50 861.01 256 4,225
Tenure 8.01 8.41 0 54
Tenure less than 1 year 0.11 0.31 0 1
Skill 1.97 0.61 1 4
Firm size (log) 4.26 1.89 0 9.56
Firm age 21.55 19.50 0 305
Firm labour productivity (log) 3.72 1.25 -15.16 14.25
Average productivity 75.94 73.15 0.03 1,368.40
Productivity spread (103Euros)
Mean absolute deviation (MAD) 72.54 103.82 0 2,482.06
Standard deviation (SD) 538.61 1,692.02 0 14,706.36
Observations 1,484,243
4 Summary statistics and econometric results
Due to computational constraints, in the regression analysis we use a 20 percent random sample
of workers from the checked panel (keeping all yearly information for the sampled workers). Table
1 presents descriptive statistics on these data. The average wage cushion is 0.23, conrming the
importance of rm-specic arrangements following industry-level collective bargaining for wage
formation.19 Furthermore, the summary statistics reveal that our measures of the productivity
spread exhibit signicant dispersion.20 Such variation will be particularly useful for identifying the
e¤ect of rm heterogeneity on wages in the econometric analysis.
4.1 Baseline model
In order to control for worker-specic unobserved heterogeneity, we exploit the longitudinal nature
of the data and estimate individual xed-e¤ects models. In addition, the regressions include a
19The wage cushion is negative whenever the observed mode of base wage is an inaccurate measure of the bargained
wage or when workers do not work the full month (either because they are sick or hired during the month). This
happens for 16.67% of our sample.
20The productivity spread measures are null when a single wage agreement covers a single rm, which corresponds
to 25 observations in our sample.
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full set of industry, region, and year dummies. For each estimate, we provide in parentheses the
standard errors that account for clustering by collective wage agreement and year. Table 2 presents
the xed e¤ects results for our baseline specication (25).
Table 2: Heterogeneity and wages, xed e¤ects
Variable Wage oor Wage cushion Actual wage
Schooling .002 .004 .007
(.0003) (.0005) (.0005)
Age .014 .009 .023
(.001) (.001) (.001)
Age2 -.0002 -.0001 -.0003
(.00001) (.00001) (.00002)
Tenure .003 -.0007 .002
(.0002) (.0002) (.0002)
Tenure less 1 year -.0008 -.014 -.015
(.001) (.002) (.002)
Skill 2 .096 -.050 .046
(.005) (.004) (.003)
Skill 3 .229 -.119 .110
(.008) (.007) (.004)
Skill 4 .219 -.052 .167
(.013) (.013) (.006)
Firm size (log) .015 .020 .035
(.0008) (.0009) (.001)
Firm age -.0002 -.0002 -.0005
(.00006) (.0001) (.00008)
Firm labour productivity (log) .001 .005 .006
(.0005) (.0007) (.0007)
Average productivity .0009 -.0006 .0003
(.0001) (.0001) (.00008)
Productivity spread (MAD) -.0005 .0003 -.0002
(.00007) (.00007) (.00004)
Implied wage-spread elasticity [-.037] [.023] [-.014]
Observations 1,484,243 1,484,243 1,484,243
R2 within .076 .029 .085
F statistic 117.18 74.87 170.84
P-value .000 .000 .000
Notes: Signicance levels:  : 10%  : 5%  : 1%. Robust standard errors in parentheses
clustered by collective wage agreement and year. The regressions are estimated by xed-e¤ects and
include industry, region and time e¤ects.
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The results shown here clearly conrm the predictions from our theoretical model. Even after
including a large set of worker and rm controls, a larger rm heterogeneity, expressed by the
mean absolute deviation (MAD), implies a signicantly (at the 1 per cent level) lower industry
wage oor and higher wage cushion. The actual wage declines as well, as the e¤ect on the wage
oor dominates the e¤ect on the wage cushion. Moreover, in all three cases, the magnitude of
the impacts, measured by the implied wage-spread elasticities, is noticeable. For instance, if rm
heterogeneity in the industry doubles, the elasticity gures indicate that, on average, the wage oor
declines by 3.7%, the wage cushion rises by 2.3% and the actual wage paid reduces by 1.4%. These
impacts are certainly non-negligible, taking into account that the distribution of the MAD across
sectoral agreements and time is very wide. For example, half of the mean MAD is at the 41st
percentile, while the double of the mean MAD is at the 92nd percentile.
The e¤ect of rm labour productivity has the expected positive sign for all wage measures.
Notice also that the e¤ect on the wage cushion is pronouncedly stronger than on the wage oor,
suggesting the presence of rm-level rent-sharing, which is a key mechanism in our theoretical
model. The impact of the average productivity level qualitatively follows that of rm-level produc-
tivity, except for the case of the wage cushion, where there is a negative relationship. This probably
reects a certain degree of asymmetry in the productivity distribution.
The remaining estimates shown in the table are all signicant and present the expected sign.
They also provide further conrmation to Cardoso and Portugals (2005) nding (based on a single
cross-section) that the wage cushion tends to stretch the impact of worker and rm attributes on
wages.
One potential concern with the xed e¤ects estimates is that both the contractual wage and
the actual paid wage are left-censored. The former cannot fall below the national minimum wage,
while the latter cannot be lower than the union wage oor, implying that the wage cushion cannot
be negative.21 As a result, our least squares estimates might be biased. We directly address this
concern by estimating Tobit random e¤ects models.
An inspection of Table 3 shows that controlling for censoring e¤ects only reinforce our previous
ndings. The marginal e¤ects of the spread of rm labour productivity are (again) signicant at the
1 per cent level and slightly larger than the ones found earlier. The elasticity e¤ects are therefore
larger. The exception is the elasticity for the wage cushion. According to the Tobit estimates, if
rm heterogeneity doubles, then the wage oor reduces by 5.7% while the actual wage paid reduces
by 2.7%.
21Censoring a¤ects 2% and 16.7% of the observations in each case, respectively.
16
Table 3: Heterogeneity and wages, Tobit random e¤ects
Variable Wage oor Wage cushion Actual wage
Male .092 .117 .203
(.0008) (.001) (.001)
Schooling .018 .021 .039
(.0001) (.0002) (.0002)
Age .019 .012 .029
(.0002) (.0002) (.0002)
Age2 -.0002 -.0001 -.0003
(2.06e-06) (2.88e-06) (2.78e-06)
Tenure .004 .002 .005
(.00005) (.00006) (.00006)
Tenure less than 1 year -.005 -.016 -.020
(.0006) (.0009) (.0008)
Skill 2 .139 -.028 .070
(.0007) (.0009) (.0009)
Skill 3 .325 -.010 .260
(.001) (.002) (.002)
Skill 4 .346 .221 .470
(.002) (.002) (.002)
Firm size (log) .025 .028 .048
(.0002) (.0002) (.0002)
Firm age -.0003 -.0002 -.0005
(.00002) (.00002) (.00002)
Firm labour productivity (log) .004 .016 .017
(.0002) (.0003) (.0002)
Average productivity .001 -.0005 .0007
(.00001) (.00002) (.00002)
Productivity spread (MAD) -.0008 .0003 -.0004
(7.26e-06) (.00001) (9.49e-06)
Implied wage-spread elasticity [-.057] [.021] [-.027]
Observations 1,484,243 1,484,243 1,484,243
Log likelihood 35,782 -496,148 -319,937
2 statistic 530,255 134,393 516,292
P-value .000 .000 .000
Sigma-u .182 .236 .266
Notes: Signicance levels:  : 10%  : 5%    : 1%. The regressions are estimated by
the tobit random model and include industry, region and time e¤ects.
The remaining estimates, once more, are signicant at the 1 per cent level and follow previous
literature.
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4.2 Alternative measures of at and sat
As an alternative to the MAD, we use the standard deviation (SD) of rm sales per worker within
each collective agreement as a measure of the productivity spread. The upper (lower) part of Table
4 reports some selected results from the xed e¤ects (Tobit random e¤ects) model.22
Table 4: Heterogeneity and wages, alternative measures
Variable Wage oor Wage cushion Actual wage
FIXED EFFECTS
Firm labour productivity (log) .002 .005 .007
(.0005) (.0007) (.0007)
Average productivity .0002 -.0001 .00008
(.00005) (.00004) (.00003)
Productivity spread (SD) -3.47e-07 1.61e-06 -1.87e-06
(1.27e-06) (1.12e-06) (6.71e-06)
Implied wage-spread elasticity [-.002] [.0009] [-.001]
Observations 1,484,243 1,484,243 1,484,243
R2 within .073 .029 .085
F statistic 115.68 72.61 167.64
P-value .000 .000 .000
TOBIT RANDOM EFFECTS
Firm labour productivity (log) .006 .015 .018
(.0002) (.0003) (.0002)
Average productivity .0004 -.0001 .0002
(4.25e-06) (6.17e-06) (5.41e-06)
Productivity spread (SD) -7.98e-06 2.74e-06 -3.28e-06
(1.42e-07) (2.08e-07) (1.80e-07)
Implied wage-spread elasticity [-.004] [.001] [-.002]
Observations 1,484,243 1,484,243 1,484,243
Log likelihood 31,342 -49,687 -320,564
2 statistic 515,603 133,877 514,277
P-value .000 .000 .000
Sigma-u .184 .236 .267
Notes: Signicance levels:  : 10%  : 5%    : 1%. All regressions include industry, region
and time e¤ects. Robust standard errors are clustered by collective wage agreement and year in the xed
e¤ects model.
Using the SD as an alternative measure of the productive spread, we obtain further conrmation
22Full results are available from the authors upon request.
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of our theoretical predictions. The major di¤erence is the size of the e¤ects, which are now much
smaller than the ones initially found.23 However, it is worth noticing that the mean and the
volatility of this series are also much higher, as suggested by the summary statistics in Table 1.
This means that, when compared to the MAD, the same relative change in the productivity spread
measured by the SD implies a much larger absolute variation. Thus, some caution is needed when
comparing the results using these two di¤erent measures of rm heterogeneity.
As a further robustness check, we have also used weighted measures for the rst and second
moments of the rms productivity distribution. To do so, we compute the mean and the spread of
rm productivity within each collective agreement using the information on rm sales per employee
at the worker-level. The resulting measures are, therefore, weighted by the number of workers in
each rm. The results not shown (but available upon request) are qualitatively similar.
4.3 Alternative measure of the wage cushion
So far, we have assumed that the wage cushion in (24) is fully driven by rm-specic arrangements
following industry-wide collective bargaining. As noted by Cardoso and Portugal (2005), however,
some industry agreements also include clauses on tenured-related payments. In such cases, the
central union might have some direct inuence on the wage cushion dened in (24), thereby chal-
lenging our interpretation of the econometric results. To address this concern, we follow Cardoso
and Portugal and consider the wage cushion in base wages only. In other words, we exclude tenure-
related and other regular components of pay from actual paid wages when computing the wage
cushion. The regression results for this alternative measure are presented in Table 5.
Table 5: Heterogeneity and wage cushion
Variable FIXED EFFECTS TOBIT RANDOM EFFECTS
Firm productivity (log) .005 .022
(.0006) (.0003)
Average productivity -.0007 -.0009
(.0001) (.00002)
Productivity spread (MAD) .0004 .0005
(.00006) (.00001)
Implied wage-spread elasticity [.027] [.037]
Observations 1,484,243 1,484,243
R2 within/Log likelihood .021 -637,561
F statistic/2 statistic 43.40 113,036
P-value .000 .000
Continues on next page...
23The only qualitative di¤erence is that the e¤ect of heterogeneity on the wage cushion is not statistically signicant
in the xed e¤ects model.
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... table 5 continued
Variable FIXED EFFECTS TOBIT RANDOM EFFECTS
Firm productivity (log) .005 .021
(.0006) (.0003)
Average productivity -.0001 -.0002
(.00004) (8.10e-06)
Productivity spread (SD) .000002 5.65e-06
(1.14e-06) (2.59e-07)
Implied wage-spread elasticity [.001] [.003]
Observations 1,484,243 1,484,243
R2 within/Log likelihood .020 -638,100
F statistic/2 statistic 41.66 111,915
P-value .000 .000
Notes: Signicance levels:  : 10%  : 5%    : 1%. All regressions include industry, region and time
e¤ects. Robust standard errors are clustered by collective wage agreement and year in the xed e¤ects model.
We nd that the relationship between the various measures of rm heterogeneity considered
earlier and the wage cushion remains positive and statistically signicant in all specications.
Moreover, in either model xed e¤ect or Tobit random e¤ect the magnitude of the e¤ects for
this alternative measure of the wage cushion is similar (slightly larger).
5 Concluding remarks
If actual paid wages result from a combination of industry-wide and rm-specic wage setting 
as in most countries with a certain degree of union centralisation what determines the relative
importance of the two levels in such a two-tiered wage setting system? In this paper we have o¤ered
one particular contribution to answering this question, by focusing on the role of rm heterogeneity
within industries. While it is intuitively plausible that rm heterogeneity should play a role in
determining the relationship between centralised and decentralised wage setting, the present paper
is, to the best of our knowledge, the rst attempt to analyse theoretically and empirically this
particular relationship.
Our results are clear and consistent. There is a systematic correlation between rm heterogene-
ity and wages set at the two stages. In more heterogeneous industries, the industry wage oor is
lower, while the average wage cushion is higher. Furthermore, the former e¤ect dominates the lat-
ter, implying that actual paid wages are lower, all else equal, in more heterogeneous industries. The
mechanisms behind these relationships are explained by a theoretical model of a unionised Cournot
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oligopoly with rm productivity heterogeneity and a two-tiered wage setting system. The relation-
ships are then empirically conrmed by using a panel dataset covering virtually all workers, rms
and collective bargaining agreements of the Portuguese private sector for the period 1991-2000, and
the results are robust to di¤erent specications and heterogeneity measures.
By way of conclusion, it should be stressed that in this paper we have only focused on one
particular factor rm heterogeneity in explaining the discrepancy between centrally bargained
and actually paid wages. Although we have shown that this is a signicant part of the explanation,
it is clearly not the whole explanation. In particular, it would be interesting to explore also the
role of worker heterogeneity. While worker attributes obviously a¤ect wages set in each stage, it is
tempting to speculate that worker heterogeneity per se could potentially play a role in explaining
the relationship between bargained and actual paid wages. This is, however, left for future research.
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Appendix
A.1. Denition of skill groups
In the econometric analysis, we include a group of dummy variables to control for the skill level
associated with the workers occupation, as dened in the ISCO-88 classication. Table A.1 presents
the denition of skill groups.
Table A.1. Description of ISCO skills
Skill Description ISCO Major group
Skill level 1 Competence associated with general
education usually acquired by com-
pletion of compulsory education.
(9) Elementary occupations
Skill level 2 Requires knowledge as for rst skill
level, but typically a longer period of
worker-related training or work ex-
perience.
(4) Clerks; (5) Service workers and
shop and market sales workers; (6)
Skilled agriculture and shery; (7)
Craft and related workers; (8) Plant
and machine operators and assem-
blers
Skill level 3 Requires a body of knowledge as-
sociated with a period of post-
compulsory education but not to de-
gree level.
(3) Technicians and associate pro-
fessionals
Skill level 4 Normally requires a degree or an
equivalent period of relevant work
experience.
(1) Legislators, senior o¢ cials and
managers; (2) Professionals
A.2. Longitudinal linked employer-employee dataset
A.2.1. Checks on the consistency of data
After deleting observations for which the worker identication code was invalid or missing, the initial
worker panel comprises 4,983,541 workers and 20,897,780 worker-year observations. Inconsistencies
were identied if the worker gender or date of birth was reported changing, or the highest schooling
level achieved by a worker was reported decreasing over time. In line with Cardoso (2006), the
following procedures were implemented to correct such inconsistencies:
(i) Dealing with missing values when reported data for the rest of the periods was absolutely
consistent. Whenever the gender, age or education of an individual was reported in a consistent
way but missing in some year(s), we have assigned the reported value to the missing observation.
These corrections a¤ected 0.00 percent, 1.78 percent and 0.89 percent of the observations in the
initial panel, respectively, for gender, age and schooling.
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(ii) Dealing with inconsistent data on gender, birth date or schooling over time. When informa-
tion was reported inconsistently over time, the information reported more than half of the times
has been taken as the correct one. Inconsistent values on gender were replaced, after checking that
the date of birth in the observation to be corrected was the same as the most frequently reported
date of birth for that worker. A similar procedure was followed for the birth date and education,
replacing inconsistent values with that reported more than half of the times. According to this
procedure, 0.84 percent, 2.54 percent and 5.65 percent of the observations in the initial panel have
been corrected for gender, birth date and education, respectively. All information on a worker
was dropped in case of remaining inconsistencies after the implementation of the previously de-
scribed corrections. This led to dropping 8.77 percent of the observations in the initial panel due
to inconsistencies for gender, 0.18 percent for age and 0.93 percent for education.
(iii) Deleting data on workers with remaining missing data on gender, age or schooling. Workers
with missing data after the implementation of the previous corrections were dropped. This led to
dropping 0.18 percent of the observations in the initial panel due to missing age and 0.93 percent
due to missing data on schooling. The checked panel included 17,366,086 worker-year observations
and 3,062,216 workers.
A.2.2. Constraints imposed
(i) Keeping full time workers, aged between 16 and 65 years old, earning at least the national mini-
mum wage. Only full-time workers working at least 25 hours a week, aged between 16 and 65 years
old, earning at least the national minimum wage were kept for the analysis (the national minimum
wage constraint might imply dropping workers in particular categories, such as apprentices and
workers aged less than 18 years old). These restrictions led to dropping, respectively, 19.15, 2.33
and 4.04 percent of the observations in the checked panel.
(ii) Keeping job categories with at least 50 workers and agreements with at least 1,000 workers.
As in Cardoso and Portugal (2005), because we are computing the contractual wage as the mode
of the distribution of base wages for each job category within each collective agreement, for each
year we have kept categories with at least 50 workers and agreements with at least 1,000 workers.
These restrictions led to dropping 9.08 percent and 1.16 percent of the checked panel, respectively.
(iii) Keeping workers covered by sectorial agreements. After the previous constraints, 87.76
percent of the workers and 83.6 percent of the worker-year observations are covered by sectorial
agreements, which are kept for the analysis.
(iv) Keeping observations from manufacturing. After the previous constraints, the worker panel
includes 8,988,169 worker-year observations and 2,209,338 workers. We then merged the worker
data with rms operating in manufacturing and services. This yields a worker-rm panel with
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information on 8,348,861 worker-year observations, 2,049,522 workers and 251,945 rms. After
further dropping the observations for which data on the independent variables were missing, and
keeping data only from mainland Portugal, the nal worker-rm panel gathers information on
1,886,703 workers, 216,681 rms and 198 sectorial agreements for the years 1991 to 2000, yielding a
total of 7,420,900 observations. Table A.2 presents the share of observations per skill group, region
and year.
Table A.2. Summary statistics
Population Sample
Skill 1 17.22 17.22
2 72.06 71.11
3 7.43 7.37
4 3.29 3.31
Region North 7.79 7.78
Center 10.72 10.69
Lisbon and Tejo Valley 39.12 39.09
Alentejo 2.21 2.20
Algarve 2.70 2.65
Year 1991 7.79 7.78
1992 8.33 8.32
1993 8.41 8.42
1994 8.39 8.40
1995 10.12 10.07
1996 10.55 10.54
1997 11.47 11.49
1998 11.01 11.01
1999 11.95 11.98
2000 11.98 12.00
Observations 7,420,900 1,484243
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